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A MODERN LOOK AT THE RIGHT TO A CIVIL JURY
TRIAL UNDER THE MAINE CONSTITUTION
Carolyn Liegner*
I. INTRODUCTION
Article I, Section 20 of the Maine Constitution states “In all civil suits, and in
all controversies concerning property, the parties shall have a right to a trial by jury,
except in cases where it has heretofore been otherwise practiced . . . .”1 The
exception noted in Section 20 has been the subject of multiple interpretations by the
Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, since the ratification of the
Maine Constitution in 1820. This has resulted in inconsistency in Maine case law,
as well as a significant shift in the right to a civil jury trial over time.
The confusion appears to be rooted in an erroneous reliance on the United States
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 2
The language granting a civil jury trial right under the Maine Constitution differs
from the language of the Seventh Amendment,3 yet for several years, the Law Court
mirrored the accepted interpretation of the Seventh Amendment in its interpretation
of Article I, Section 20.4 Under this view, the Maine Constitution “preserves the
right to a jury trial in civil actions where that right existed when the Maine
Constitution was adopted.”5 In other words, actions that did not exist prior to 1820,
as well as actions that had no right to a jury trial at common law, do not have the
right to a jury trial under this interpretation. In 1986, the Law Court first used this
reading of Article I, Section 20 to determine there to be no jury trial right for traffic
infractions with a penalty of license revocation in State v. Anton.6 The Law Court
reasoned that because license revocation was not a remedy at common law, there is
currently no jury trial right for such an action.7
This interpretation was extended by the Law Court in Dir. of Bureau of Labor
Standards v. Fort Halifax Packing Co.8 In this decision, the court affirmed the trial
court’s holding that there is no right to a jury trial in actions involving the state’s
severance pay statute. The court reasoned that because no such action existed at
common law, using the interpretation introduced in Anton, there is no right to a jury
* J.D. Candidate, University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2017. The Author is grateful to
Associate Professor Dmitry Bam for his guidance throughout the writing process, and to Justice Wayne
Douglas for asking the hard questions. The Author would like to thank her family for always cheering
her on, especially her husband, Adam, and daughter, Claire.
1. ME. CONST. art. I, § 20 (emphasis added).
2. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916) (holding that “the 7th
Amendment applies only to proceedings in courts of the United States, and does not in any manner
whatever govern or regulate trials by jury in state courts . . . .”).
3. ME. CONST. art. I, § 20; U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
4. See State v. Anton, 463 A.2d 703, 709 (Me. 1983); see also Dir. of Bureau of Lab. Standards v.
Fort Halifax Packing Co., 510 A.2d 1054, 1063 (Me. 1986).
5. Fort Halifax Packing, 510 A.2d at 1063 (emphasis omitted).
6. 463 A.2d 703 (Me. 1983).
7. Id. at 708.
8. 510 A.2d at 1054.
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trial in these circumstances.9
In City of Portland v. DePaolo10 in 1987, the Law Court abruptly reversed
course, departing from the interpretation of Article I, Section 20 it used in Anton and
Fort Halifax Packing.11 The court stated, “In language plain and broad, [A]rticle I,
[S]ection 20 guarantees to parties in all civil suits the right to a jury trial, except
whereby the common law and Massachusetts statutory law that existed prior to the
adoption of the Maine Constitution in 1820 such cases were decided without a
jury.”12 Under this interpretation of the Article I, Section 20 exception, the court
held that the defendant had a right to a jury trial in an action involving violation of
the City of Portland’s anti-pornography ordinance, a cause of action that did not exist
at common law.13 With minimal analysis or explanation of the significant departure
from its previous interpretation, the court broadened the right to a civil jury trial
under the Maine Constitution considerably, beyond the scope of the federal right
under the Seventh Amendment. The court’s correction in DePaolo properly
interprets the plain text of Article I, Section 20 and reflects Maine’s longstanding
commitment to the civil jury trial.
The challenge in determining whether there is a jury trial right under Article I,
Section 20 is that intensive research and historical analysis must be undertaken
separately for each type of action. To determine the jury trial right for each type of
action, a party must put forth an argument based on historical research into
Massachusetts’s statutory law and common law prior to the adoption of the Maine
Constitution in 1820.14 Under the DePaolo interpretation, the analysis can be even
more complex. For actions that did not exist at common law, the law requires that
one must first examine “suits of the same general nature” in 1820 to determine
whether the action was decided without a jury at the time. 15 This analysis is
frequently time-intensive, and may be prohibitively time-consuming when being
conducted to determine whether there is a jury trial right for an action that will not
typically drive large legal fees, for example, in a small claims case or a Forcible
Entry and Detainer (FED) action.
As evidenced by the interpretation of the civil jury trial right under the Maine
Constitution, which was upheld for many years, state courts often substitute the wellsettled interpretation of United States constitutional provisions for the independent
interpretation of the language of state constitutions. In some states, this can be
attributed to limited judicial resources, as well as the abundance of federal case law
that exists on each constitutional provision. But especially for provisions of the
United States Constitution that the states have not incorporated, such as the Seventh

9. Id. at 1063.
10. 531 A.2d 669 (Me. 1987).
11. The court did not reference its departure from precedential interpretation of the exception in
Article 1, Section 20. It only stated “[t]he unmistakable import of [the exception] obviates resort either
to nice semantic distinctions or to wooden interpretative principles.” Id. at 670.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 671.
14. See N. Sch. Congregate Hous. v. Merrithew, 558 A.2d 1189, 1190 (Me. 1989).
15. Id.; see also In re Shane T., 544 A.2d 1295, 1297 (Me. 1988) (“Since prior to 1820 suits of the
same general nature as the present action fell within the jurisdiction of the chancery courts and were not
tried to a jury . . . .”).
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Amendment,16 the judiciary is in error in substituting the federal constitutional
provision for that of the state. In substituting the Court’s interpretation of the
Seventh Amendment for the proper interpretation of Article I, Section 20 of the
Maine Constitution, the Law Court overlooked the Maine Constitution, and in
essence, assumed incorporation where it does not exist. The court’s correction in
DePaolo not only broadened the right to a civil jury trial under Maine law, but also
reclaimed the power of the Maine Constitution in determining the legal rights of
Maine citizens.
This Comment will first undertake a historical survey of the right to a civil jury
trial under the Maine Constitution, as it has been both narrowed and broadened by
the Law Court’s interpretation of Article I, Section 20 over the years. 17 Next, this
Comment will analyze the right to a jury trial in several common civil actions under
the court’s corrected interpretation of Article I, Section 20. Finally, this Comment
will argue that the court’s reversal of its interpretation of the provision in Anton was
the proper legal outcome for several reasons, including honoring the plain meaning
of the Maine Constitution’s text, mitigating unequal outcomes, promoting judicial
consistency, and treating the Maine Constitution as worthy of interpretation distinct
from that of the Federal Constitution.
II. A HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE CIVIL JURY TRIAL RIGHT UNDER THE MAINE
CONSTITUTION
A. An Introduction to the Civil Jury Trial Right
The right to a civil jury trial has long been considered a cornerstone of the
American legal system.18 While there has been heated debate among academics and
lawyers in recent decades on whether the civil jury trial right in America benefits the
judicial system or leads to fairer outcomes, 19 the right to be judged by one’s peers
16. In 1916, the Supreme Court held in Bombolis that the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury is
not incorporated to the states. 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916).
17. Although there is a long history of both judicial and legislative recognition of a broad jury trial
right in Maine, the right has not been held static over time. At various points in Maine’s history, the
Legislature and the drafters of the Maine Rules of Court have also narrowed the right to a civil jury trial
for specific claims of action by statute or court rule, respectively. For example, in 1976, District Court
Rule 80H, which granted concurrent jurisdiction to the Superior Court in civil violations proceedings,
became effective. This rule was amended in 1977 to prohibit the removal of civil violation proceedings
from the District Court to the Superior Court. Rule 80H, read in conjunction with former M.D.C. CIV. R.
73, which restricted appeals to questions of law, eliminated the right to a jury trial on civil violations. See
Gerald F. Petruccelli & John D. McKay, The Right to Jury Trial Under the Maine Constitution, 1. ME. B.
J. 240, 242-43 (1986). The Law Court held in DePaolo that these two rules were unenforceable in actions
in which there is a constitutional right to a jury trial under Article I, Section 20. 531 A.2d 669, 671 (Me.
1987). The Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts and the Superior Courts have since been
abrogated by the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, which contain no provisions limiting the right to a jury
trial. This paper will mainly analyze the Law Court’s decisions that have narrowed and broadened the
civil jury trial right; actions by the Legislature and the drafters of the Maine Rules of Court are largely
beyond its scope.
18. Paul D. Carrington, The Civil Jury and American Democracy, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 79,
79 (2003).
19. The debate on the value of the civil jury trial has been the subject of many scholarly legal articles
and books. Proponents of the right, including Paul Carrington, cite several key reasons for its importance,
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has consistently been considered a fundamental element of American democracy
throughout history. The use of juries in civil cases can be traced back to eleventh
century England, when “petty juries” sat in the common law courts administered by
the royal judges sent from Westminster to “bring the king’s law to every shire of the
realm.”20 In Dimick v. Schiedt,21 the United States Supreme Court elucidated the
centrality and importance of the jury trial to American civil procedure:
[T]rial by jury has always been, and still is, generally regarded as the normal and
preferable mode of disposing of issues of fact in civil cases at law as well as in
criminal cases. Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance
and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming
curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care. 22

The civil jury trial right became increasingly important to American colonists in
the eighteenth century, as tensions grew between the colonists and the royal judges
sent from England to preside over controversies. 23 Although each state adopted
different constitutional language on the right to a jury trial, the tradition of a
constitutional right to a jury in both civil and criminal cases was reflected in all
eleven state constitutions ratified before 1787.24
Whether to include the right to a civil jury trial was of significant controversy
during the framing of the Federal Constitution. The inclusion of such a right was of
high priority for Anti-federalists,25 but was ultimately omitted as a key element of
compromise.26 One reason for its omission was that different existing practices
among the states would make framing a general rule difficult. 27 However, the
ratification of the Seventh Amendment28 in 1791 reflected the continued widespread
belief that the jury is an important element of our political process and a key

including serving as an important check on the judiciary. Id. at 89; see also Victoria A. Farrar-Myers &
Jason B. Myers, Echoes of the Founding: The Jury in Civil Cases as Conferrer of Legitimacy, 54 SMU L.
REV. 1857, 1858 (2001). Additionally, Carrington claims the right to a civil jury “imparts structural
rigidity to civil procedure that is not encountered in other legal systems.” Carrington, supra note 18, at
91. In contrast, Jerome Frank argues that “the single greatest obstacle to effective fact-finding” is the
jury, because juries are “stupid, ill-informed, swayed by emotion and prejudice, indifferent to legal rules,
and unscientific in reaching verdicts.” JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN
AMERICAN JUSTICE 8-9 (1973).
20. Carrington, supra note 18, at 80.
21. 293 U.S. 474, 485 (1935).
22. Id. at 485-86.
23. Carrington, supra note 18, at 82.
24. Id. at 83.
25. The Anti-federalists viewed the jury as an important check on power of the federal government,
and a safeguard against corruption. Specifically, the Anti-federalists viewed the jury as an additional
separation of power, but one within the judicial branch. See Carrington, supra note 18, at 84-85.
26. Id.
27. Lisa S. Meyer, Taking the "Complexity" Out of Complex Litigation: Preserving the Constitutional
Right to a Civil Jury Trial, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 337, 342-43 (1993).
28. The Seventh Amendment provides:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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safeguard against the power of the judiciary. 29
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Seventh Amendment has been fairly
consistent, with one scholar arguing that it “has been interpreted as if it were virtually
a self-explanatory provision.”30 Since Justice Story’s interpretation of the Seventh
Amendment in United States v. Wonson,31 the United States Supreme Court has
interpreted the amendment to include two key features. First, the right to a civil jury
trial is determined by examining English common law in 1791, not by looking to the
present-day laws of the United States.32 Second, the determination is made by
“render[ing] . . . the common law of England temporally static, for the matured
doctrine also required that the view of English law be taken as of the date of the
adoption of the Seventh Amendment in 1791.”33 Hence, the language of the Seventh
Amendment, as interpreted by the Court, creates a narrower federal right to a civil
jury trial than is available under the language of Article I, Section 20 of the Maine
Constitution.34
Although the Supreme Court has been consistent in its interpretation of the
Seventh Amendment, it is one of three amendments to the Constitution that have not
been incorporated to the states, and there is significant variation in the civil jury trial
right offered under state constitutions. The majority of the Bill of Rights has been
incorporated through the theory of selective incorporation, under which the Supreme
Court analyzes whether the particular protection is “fundamental to our Nation’s
particular scheme of ordered liberty and system of justice.” 35 Upon the Court’s
determination that a protection is fundamental, it is incorporated to the states under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 36 Although the Supreme
Court’s rationale for failing to incorporate the Seventh Amendment to the states is
somewhat cloudy, the Court has maintained its position on this issue since its 1875
decision in Walker v. Sauvinet.37
Despite the lack of incorporation of the Seventh Amendment to the states, the
majority of states voluntarily maintain a right to a civil jury trial equivalent to that
provided by the Seventh Amendment. 38 Today, forty-nine of fifty states provide
civil litigants with some right to a jury, either through constitutional provision, state
statute, or common law decision.39 Colorado is the only state that does not recognize

29. Carrington, supra note 18, at 83.
30. Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV.
639, 639 (1973).
31. 28 F.Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750).
32. Wolfram, supra note 30, at 641-42.
33. Id.
34. MARSHALL J. TINKLE, THE MAINE STATE CONSTITUTION 59 (2d ed. 2013).
35. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 763-64 (2010).
36. Id. at 759.
37. See id. at 765 n.13 (“Our governing decisions regarding the . . . Seventh Amendment’s civil jury
trial requirement long predate the era of selective incorporation.”); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92
(1875) (holding that due process does not necessarily require a jury trial so long as “the trial is had
according to the settled course of judicial proceedings.”).
38. TED A. DONNER & RICHARD K. GABRIEL, JURY SELECTION STRATEGY AND SCIENCE § 35:2 (3d
ed. 2015).
39. Id.
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a right to a civil jury trial. 40 In Connecticut, “[t]he constitutional prohibition on the
abridgment of the jury trial right historically has been interpreted to apply, not in all
possible instances, but only in those cases for which the right existed when the
constitution was adopted.”41 In many states, because the right to a jury trial in civil
cases only exists for actions that held that right at common law, determining whether
a right exists today requires a historical analysis, just as it does under the Seventh
Amendment.
In addition to the variations in the language of civil jury trial rights offered under
different state constitutions, the methods used by state courts to interpret the right
vary as well. State courts have the final authority to interpret state constitutions. 42
In doing so, courts generally use one of three methodologies to interpret a state
constitutional provision in relation to federal constitutional law: the lockstep
approach, the criteria approach, and the primacy approach.43 The lockstep approach,
in which the state court looks only to the interpretation of the federal constitutional
provision in determining the meaning of the state constitution, was frequently used
in the middle part of the twentieth century, and, in many cases, rendered state
constitutional provisions completely ineffectual. 44 Some argue that “the lockstep
approach remains the most common approach to state constitutionalism.” 45
However, in the late 1970s, after a period of expansion of federal constitutional
law, the importance of state constitutions in protecting the rights of state citizens was
brought to light in a Harvard Law Review article written by Justice Brennan. 46 Often
referred to as “New Judicial Federalism,” 47 Brennan’s call to revitalize state
constitutional law relies on the premise that state courts must broadly interpret state
constitutional guarantees.48
The two methodologies of interpretation that align with new judicial federalist
principles are the criteria approach and the primacy approach. Under the criteria
approach, the courts use several criteria to determine whether the state constitutional
provision allows broader protection, warranting deviating from the federal
constitutional interpretation.49 Although the criteria used by different courts vary
under this approach, one criterion commonly used by the court is whether the text of
40. Id.; see also Firelock Inc. v. District Court, 776 P.2d 1090, 1097 (Colo. 1989) (en banc) (clarifying
that “there is no constitutional right to a jury trial in civil cases” in Colorado).
41. Gentile v. Altermatt, 363 A.2d 1, 17 (Conn. 1975) (citing La Croix v. County Comm’rs, 50 Conn.
321, 327 (1882)).
42. Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial Federalism, 28
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 101 (2000); see generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
43. Friedman, supra note 42, at 105.
44. Id. at 102.
45. Robert K. Fitzpatrick, Note, Neither Icarus Nor Ostrich: State Constitutions as an Independent
Source of Individual Rights, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1833, 1850 (2004).
46. Brennan, supra note 42.
47. “New judicial federalism” has been the topic of much scholarly writing since Justice Brennan’s
introduction of the concept in 1977. See, e.g., David Schuman, A Failed Critique of State
Constitutionalism, 91 MICH. L. REV. 274, 280 (1992); see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 45, at 1850. This
Comment will not attempt to explore the nuances of this vast area of state constitutional law.
48. Joseph Blocher, What State Constitutional Law Can Tell Us About the Federal Constitution, 115
PENN ST. L. REV. 1035, 1037 (2011).
49. Friedman, supra note 42, at 104.
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the state constitutional provision “differs significantly from its federal
counterpart.”50 Other criteria can include “[the] legislative history of the state
constitutional provision; . . . preexisting state law, . . . [and] state traditions, which
may emphasize greater protections for individual rights . . . .” 51
In contrast to the criteria approach, which judges use to determine when a
deviation from the interpretation of its federal counterpart is warranted, the primacy
approach interprets the state constitutional provision independently of the federal
provision.52 The court assumes that the state constitution guarantees significant
rights to its citizens, and then determines the scope of those rights by using standard
tools of statutory interpretation, such as examining the language of the provision and
considering prior interpretations of the provision by the state courts. 53 State courts
have used all three approaches to interpret the language of various state constitutional
provisions. As this Comment will discuss in depth, the Law Court has used both the
“lockstepping" method of interpretation as well as the primary approach to arrive at
very different interpretations of the right to a civil jury trial under the Maine
Constitution.
B. The Civil Jury Trial Right Under the Maine Constitution
Article I, Section 20 of the Declaration of Rights of the Maine Constitution
promises a broader right to a civil jury trial than is offered by many states. Its
language has been consistent since the ratification of the Declaration of Rights of the
Maine Constitution in 1820, and has guaranteed an affirmative right to a civil jury
trial.54 The provision states, “In all civil suits, and in all controversies concerning
property, the parties shall have a right to a trial by jury, except in cases where it has
heretofore been otherwise practiced; the party claiming the right may be heard by
himself or herself and with counsel, or either, at the election of the party.” 55 This
provision derived from Article XV of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, which
stated in part, “In all controversies concerning property, and in all suits between two
or more persons, except in cases in which it has heretofore been otherways used and
practised, the parties have a right to a trial by jury . . . .” 56 As the Law Court stated
in Farnsworth v. Whiting,57 the Maine provision “is in all substantial particulars the
same as that of Massachusetts.”58
Unlike the Seventh Amendment, which has been interpreted to refer exclusively
to a jury trial right under English common law, the right to a jury trial under Article
I, Section 20 relies on historical state law, as nearly thirty years of Massachusetts
law existed at the time of the ratification of the Maine Constitution. 59 However, the
roots of the English common law system still influence its scope. For example, as
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 104-05.
Id. at 105.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 106-07.
ME. CONST. art. I, § 20.
Id.
MASS. CONST. of 1780, Part the First, art. XV.
106 Me. 430, 76 A. 909 (1910).
Id. at 911.
TINKLE, supra note 34, at 59.
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the Law Court held in its decision in Farnsworth in 1910,60 the right to a civil jury
trial is a common law right, which is not extended to suits at equity. 61
Like the Seventh Amendment, Article I, Section 20 of the Maine Constitution
requires a historical analysis of the legal system in place at the time of its adoption
in 1820 to determine whether a current jury trial right exists for a specific action.
But in contrast with the analysis required under the Seventh Amendment and the
state constitutions that mirror it, the historical analysis required to determine whether
there is a present-day right to a jury trial for a particular action under the Maine
Constitution is more complex. The historical analysis requires several layers of
inquiry, including comparisons between present-day actions, such as license
revocations, to actions “similar in nature” at common law.62 The opportunity to
conduct such an analysis has simply not arisen for each type of civil action in the
Maine courts because it is uncommon for a litigant to request a jury trial in the first
place, 63 and even less common for a litigant to appeal a decision based on the fact
that a request for a jury trial was denied.
C. The Maine Supreme Court’s Interpretation of
Article I, Section 20 Before State v. Anton
Article I, Section 20 of the Maine Constitution promises a broader right to a jury
trial than does the U.S. Constitution.64 Rather than only offering a right to a jury trial
in actions that held that right at common law, the provision protects the right to a
jury trial as long as the type of action in question does not fall within the exceptions
noted in Article I, Section 20. The Law Court first interpreted Article I, Section 20
in Farnsworth in 1910.65 In Farnsworth, the administratrix of an estate sued for the
return of articles of personal property that had belonged to the decedent.66 The court
held that the action was equitable in nature, and would have been heard in the
chancery court at common law.67 Thus, the cause of action fell firmly into the
exception noted in Article I, Section 20, and no jury trial right existed. 68
60. 106 Me. at 430, 76 A. at 911 (holding “[t]he article as it now stands is a declaration of the common
law right to a trial by jury, and in no way inconsistent with the establishment of a court of chancery having
general jurisdiction, as it was at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and proceeding in accordance
with its fundamental rules of practice as then existing.”); see also Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Envtl.
Improvement Comm’n, 307 A.2d 1 (Me. 1973).
61. Suits at equity are proceedings in which the remedy sought is not monetary compensation, but
instead is some other sort of special remedy by the court, such as an injunction. See TINKLE, supra note
34, at 60. The origin of these proceedings is English common law, which had both courts of law and
courts of equity (also known as chancery courts). Courts of law had jurisdiction over “actions at law,”
while courts of equity had jurisdiction over suits in equity.
62. See N. Sch. Congregate Hous. v. Merrithew, 558 A.2d 1189, 1190 (Me. 1989).
63. Although statistics on how many civil litigants request jury trials are not available in Maine, data
show that only three to four percent of cases were resolved through a jury trial in Maine in 2004. See
KENNETH T. PALMER ET AL., MAINE POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT 104 (2d ed. 2009). However, Palmer
suggests that the number of jury trials in Maine has stayed fairly constant in recent years, which goes
against the national trend of a reduction of in the number of jury trials used to resolve civil disputes. Id.
64. See TINKLE, supra note 34, at 59.
65. 106 Me. at 430, 76 A. at 909.
66. Id., 76 A. at 910.
67. Id., 76 A. at 911.
68. Id., 76 A. at 911.
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After Farnsworth, the Law Court continued to interpret the exception in a
manner consistent with the provision’s text, although the next Article I, Section 20
case did not arise for almost sixty years. 69 Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Envtl.
Improvement Comm’n,70 decided in 1973, concerned the plaintiffs’ right to a jury
trial to determine third-party damages under the Oil Discharge Prevention and
Pollution Control Act of 1970, which required damages to be determined by
arbitration conducted by an administrative body.71 The court held that at common
law, “the Legislature directed the County Commissioners to determine the flowage
damages and report to the Court.”72 The report was subject to impeachment by a
jury, but was not originally determined by a jury, and therefore no right to a formal
jury trial attached to damage to real property. 73 Additionally, the court cited to an
early case concerning damage to real property under the Mill Act, in which the court
determined that the suit was at equity, and therefore held no jury trial right under
Article I, Section 20.74
In its 1979 decision in Cyr v. Cote,75 the Law Court was consistent in its
interpretation of the provision, stating, “Our constitutional provision safeguards the
right to a jury trial on all legal claims.”76 The court properly differentiated between
legal and equitable claims to determine whether the exception applied,
acknowledging, “To determine the often elusive question of whether a claim is legal
or equitable, there must be an appraisal of the basic nature of this issue presented,
including the relief sought.”77 The court implicitly distinguished Cyr from
Farnsworth, reasoning that although both cases involved estates, the cause of action
in Cyr contained broader legal issues, including undue influence, duress, and lack of
capacity.78 The Cyr court concluded that the cause of action as a whole was legal in
nature, and therefore held an affirmative right to a jury trial exists in such actions. 79
D. The Law Court’s Incorrect Interpretation under State v. Anton
After almost 100 years of interpreting Article I, Section 20 in a manner
consistent with its text, the Law Court made an about-face, applying a dichotomous
interpretation and narrowing the jury trial right protected by the Maine Constitution.
In 1983, the Law Court significantly constricted the right to a civil jury trial in its
erroneous interpretation of Article I, Section 20 in State v. Anton.80 The court’s
reasoning for its departure from the long-held guarantee of a broad right to a jury
trial may have been driven by several factors, including an undercurrent of judicial

69. See Thad B. Zmistowski, Note, City of Portland v. DePaolo: Defining the Role of Stare Decisis
in State Constitutional Decisionmaking, 41 ME. L. REV. 201, 205 (1989).
70. 307 A.2d 1 (Me. 1973).
71. Id. at 10.
72. Id. at 28.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 396 A.2d 1013, 1016 (Me. 1979).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1017, 1019 n.8.
79. Id. at 1017.
80. 463 A.2d 703, 708 (Me. 1983).
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expediency, a desire to protect administrative procedural process, as well as the
court’s willingness to substitute federal constitutional interpretation for proper
interpretation of Maine’s own constitution. The confluence of these factors likely led
to the Law Court’s illogical, somewhat tortured analysis used to arrive at the
conclusion that Article I, Section 20 does not include the right to a jury trial for a
defendant charged with a speeding violation.81
In Anton, two defendants in two separate cases were charged with exceeding the
speed limit in violation of Maine statutory law. 82 Each defendant requested his case
be transferred from the District Court, where the case was filed, to the Superior Court
for a jury trial.83 The District Court denied both motions, found each defendant
responsible for committing the traffic violation, and imposed a fine.84 Each
defendant appealed to the Superior Court in his respective county. 85 The
Cumberland County Superior Court affirmed the District Court’s denial of a jury
trial, while York County reversed, ordering that the case “remain on the civil docket
of the Superior Court for further proceedings.” 86 Both cases were brought to the Law
Court on appeal, where they were combined under the same issue: whether
defendants had a right to a jury trial in a traffic infraction proceeding. 87
In its decision, the Law Court first held that a traffic infraction—with a possible
penalty of license revocation—did not constitute a criminal violation for which a
jury trial would be guaranteed under Article I, Section 7 of the Maine Constitution. 88
Defendants argued that even if the court deemed the infraction a civil violation, their
right to a civil jury trial was preserved under Article 1, Section 20. 89 In response to
defendants’ argument, the court stated: “That provision, substantially similar to
Article 15 of the Declaration of Rights in the Massachusetts Constitution, preserves
the right to jury trial in civil actions where that right existed when the Maine
Constitution was adopted.”90 The court cited to only one case following this
interpretation, the case of State v. Sklar,91 which does not reference the right to a civil
jury trial, but only the right to a criminal jury trial under Article I, Section 7. 92
The court went on to state: “The provision does not apply to suits in equity or
other civil proceedings not then tried by jury in the common law courts,” 93 citing five

81. Id. at 708-09.
82. Id. at 704. The statute in question was 29 M.R.S.A. § 1251 (Supp. 1982), repealed by P.L. 1993,
ch. 683 (effective Apr. 14, 1994).
83. Anton, 463 A.2d at 704.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 705 (internal citation omitted).
87. Id. at 704.
88. Id. at 706-08. The Law Court considered factors including the severity of the potential penalties,
as well as the nature of the infraction, in determining that the violation was not criminal in nature.
89. Id. at 708.
90. Id.
91. 317 A.2d 160 (Me. 1974).
92. Id. at 169-71.
93. Anton, 463 A.2d at 708.
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cases94 and one judicial opinion95 in Maine and Massachusetts in which the right to
a civil jury trial was in question. The court was partly right. It has long been held
that no right to a jury trial exists in actions at equity, because equity courts did not
include juries at common law.96 For example, in Portland Pipe Line, the court held
there to be no Constitutional right to a civil jury trial for damages caused to property
owners from the construction of a dam, because the action was closest to an eminent
domain proceeding, which is a proceeding at equity. 97 However, the Anton court’s
conclusion that the right to a jury trial does not apply to “other civil proceedings not
then tried by jury in the common law courts”98 was incorrect. The court incorrectly
interpreted the cases it cited to exclude the right to a jury trial in actions unknown at
common law. None of the five cases cited interpreted Article I, Section 20 to prohibit
the right to a jury trial in actions that did not exist at common law. Two of the cited
cases concerned actions at equity, which do not hold a jury trial right. 99 One involved
an action determined by a proceeding other than a jury trial prior to 1820, precluding
the common law right to a jury trial today. 100 Finally, two of the actions were
determined to be outside the right to a jury trial as defined by the Massachusetts
Constitution, which contains an exception to the jury trial right for actions at equity
at common law similar to that provided in the Maine Constitution. 101
Based on its improper interpretation and analysis of precedent under
Massachusetts and Maine law, the court in Anton concluded that there is no right to
a jury trial in traffic infraction proceedings, reasoning “[w]e are aware of no civil
suit in 1819 that would have been comparable to such a proceeding.” 102 The court’s
interpretation of Article I, Section 20 in Anton was in direct contradiction to the plain
text of the provision. The implications of this incorrect interpretation of the text are
significant. By putting forth this interpretation, the Law Court narrowed the right to
94. Id. at 708-09. The Anton court cited the following cases in holding no right to a civil jury trial
unless that right affirmatively existed for such an action at common law: Portland Pipe Line Corp. v.
Envtl. Improvement Comm’n, 307 A.2d 1, 28 (Me. 1973); Farnsworth v. Whiting, 106 Me. 430, 76 A.
909 (1910); Kennebec Water Dist. v. City of Waterville, 96 Me. 234, 52 A. 774 (1902) (condemnation
proceedings); cf. Ashley v. Wait, 116 N.E. 961 (Mass. 1917) (no jury trial for petition under corrupt
practices act); Attorney General v. Sullivan, 40 N.E. 843 (Mass. 1895) (no jury trial in quo warrants
proceeding to try title to political office).
95. Opinion of the Justices, 315 A.2d 847, 852 (Me. 1974). The judicial opinion, cited by the Anton
court, upheld Maine’s workers’ compensation law as constitutional, reasoning that participation was
elective between employer and employee, and the law did not interfere with the right to a jury trial under
Article I, Section 20.
96. See Farnsworth, 106 Me. at 430, 76 A. at 911.
97. 307 A.2d at 28.
98. Anton, 463 A.2d at 708.
99. Portland Pipe Line, 307 A.2d at 29 (a civil action is equitable in nature, and does not hold a
common law right to a civil jury trial under Article 1, Section 20); see also Farnsworth, 106 Me. at 430,
76 A. at 911.
100. See Kennebec Water Dist. v. City of Waterville, 96 Me. 234, 234, 52 A. 774, 780 (1902) (holding
that a proceeding for assessing the amount of just compensation for private property taken for public uses
is not a civil suit, but a ‘proceeding in rem’).
101. See Ashley, 228 Mass. 63, 80, 116 N.E. 961, 967 (1917) (no jury trial for petition under corrupt
practices act because public office is not “property” within the definition of “suits concerning property”);
Sullivan, 163 Mass. 446, 451, 40 N.E. 843, 846 (1895) (one’s right to public office is not a controversy
concerning property, so no jury trial right exists).
102. Anton, 463 A.2d at 709.
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a jury trial to apply only to actions that existed prior to the adoption of the Maine
Constitution in 1820. The court further limited the jury trial right by shifting the
burden of proof to the defendant to identify a “suit of a similar nature” that held the
right to a jury trial at common law. 103 Given the complex research and analysis
required to determine whether a jury trial right existed for a particular type of action
at common law, placing the burden of proof on the defendant created a significant
barrier to access to a jury trial in certain civil actions.
The court’s precise rationale for its abrupt departure from over one hundred
years of precedent104 is impossible to determine, in part due to the lack of any logical
justification contained in the Anton decision itself. However, several factors may
have influenced the court’s decision to interpret Article I, Section 20 in a manner
contrary to the text of the provision, well-established precedent, and a judicial culture
in Maine that had rigorously upheld the right to a jury trial for decades. 105
The decision may have been influenced by a desire for judicial efficiency,
especially given the roles and responsibilities of the District and Superior Courts in
Maine. The Maine Superior Court is the only court able to conduct jury trials.
Therefore, narrowing the constitutional right to a jury trial in civil cases can limit
overburdening the Superior Court.106 The court alluded to this concern in its tone at
one point in Anton, where Justice Godfrey stated, “[w]e are concerned here with an
entire system for disposition of traffic infractions that requires the District Court
judge first to determine a defendant’s liability and then either impose a civil fine
within prescribed limits or suspend defendant’s operator’s license.” 107 His statement
implied that defendants’ claim of a jury trial right would disrupt the entire system
that has been put into place to allow the District Court to decide traffic infractions.
The court’s decision to go against precedent in Anton was likely made easier by
the prevalence of state courts across the nation substituting federal constitutional
interpretation for proper interpretation of state constitutional provisions. 108 This
phenomenon, known as “lockstepping,” is a common method of state constitutional
analysis today, but was even more pervasive at the time of the Anton decision.109 By
borrowing the accepted interpretation of the Seventh Amendment and applying it to
Article I, Section 20 of the Maine Constitution, the court effectively narrowed the
civil jury trial right while maintaining an appearance of legitimacy in its
interpretation.
Anton was controlling precedent for four years. But even under Anton, the court
sometimes found in favor of a jury trial if the party requesting the jury could prove
such a right existed at common law. For example, in Ela v. Pelletier,110 a unanimous
court held that the Maine small claims procedure was unconstitutional as it infringed

103. Id. (stating “[defendants] cite no authority for the proposition that a comparable civil suit by the
Commonwealth even existed in 1819, let alone that it was heard by a jury.”).
104. Petruccelli & McKay, supra note 17, at 246.
105. See id. (“From Johnson’s Case to State v. Sklar to Ela v. Pelletier, the Law Court has vigilantly
rejected expedient attempts to circumvent the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury.”).
106. PALMER, supra note 63.
107. Anton, 463 A.2d at 709.
108. See Friedman, supra note 42.
109. See Blocher, supra note 48, at 1037; see also PALMER, supra note 63, at 102-03.
110. 495 A.2d 1225 (Me. 1985).
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on the right to a jury trial in a small claims action. 111 In its analysis, the court quoted
Anton, stating “[t]his provision ‘preserves the right to a jury trial in civil actions
where that right existed when the Maine Constitution was adopted.”112 Because a
small claims action was heard by a jury under Massachusetts statute prior to 1820,
Ela’s action was considered “of a kind that was heard and determined by a common
law court with a right to a jury trial prior to the adoption of the Maine
Constitution.”113 Thus, the court upheld the right to a jury trial for small claims
actions under the Anton interpretation.114 Although small claims actions fell within
the narrower right to a civil jury trial under the Anton interpretation, the fact that the
court did not take the opportunity to correct this interpretation in Ela helped to
cement the incorrect interpretation further.
Perhaps of greater significance was the Law Court’s exclusion of the right to a
jury trial for an action that did not exist at common law in Dir. of Bureau of Labor
Standards v. Fort Halifax Packing Co.115 in 1986. In this case, the court used the
Anton interpretation to determine whether an action to collect severance pay under
Maine statute has a right to a jury trial. 116 The Law Court quoted Anton extensively
in its decision:
When a new type of statutory action is created, the existence of a constitutional right
to jury trial under [A]rticle I, [S]ection 20 depends on the nature of the action. If it
is a kind that was heard and determined by a common law court with a right to jury
trial prior to adoption of the Maine Constitution, then [A]rticle I, [S]ection 20
guarantees that right today.117

Using this reasoning, the Law Court concluded that there is no jury trial
available in an action to recover severance pay under Maine statute, because there
was no such action at common law. 118 The Law Court upheld the Superior Court’s
denial of defendant’s request for a trial by jury, 119 further narrowing the civil jury
trial right under the Anton interpretation.
E. The Reversal of the Anton Interpretation in City of Portland v. Depaolo
Four years after Anton, the Law Court abruptly reversed its interpretation of
Article I, Section 20 in City of Portland v. DePaolo, restoring the provision’s
guarantee of a broad right to a civil jury trial. 120 In DePaolo, defendants were
assessed civil penalties in the District Court for violating the City of Portland’s antipornography ordinance for selling obscene magazines to undercover police
officers.121 Defendants requested removal of the case to the Superior Court for a jury

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 1228.
Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Anton, 463 A.2d at 708).
Id. (quoting Anton, 463 A.2d at 709).
Id.
510 A.2d 1054 (Me. 1986).
Id. at 1056.
Id. at 1063 (quoting Anton, 463 A.2d at 709).
Id.
Id.
531 A.2d 669 (Me. 1987).
Id. at 669.
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trial, but their request was denied.122 One of the questions on appeal to the Law Court
was whether defendants had the right to a jury trial for the violation of a civil
ordinance under Article I, Section 20.123 The Law Court did not reference Anton124
at any point in its interpretation of the provision, which stated:
The unmistakable import of [the Article I, Section 20 exception] obviates resort
either to nice semantic distinctions or to wooden interpretative principles. In
language plain and broad[,] [A]rticle I, [S]ection 20 guarantees to parties in all civil
suits the right to a jury trial, except where by the common law and Massachusetts
statutory law that existed prior to the adoption of the Maine Constitution in 1820
such cases were decided without a jury. 125

In its affirmative interpretation of the Article I, Section 20 exception, the
DePaolo court cited to several of the very cases incorrectly interpreted in Anton,
including Farnsworth, Portland Pipeline, and Kennebec Water District.126
However, the court did not explicitly overrule Anton or address the reversal of its
interpretation of Article I, Section 20 under Anton.127 The DePaolo court simply
stated that there was a “broad constitutional guarantee of the right to a jury trial in
all civil cases” granted by Article I, Section 20.128 Without explanation for its aboutface, the court effectively reversed its earlier narrowing of the civil jury trial right
under the Maine Constitution. 129 It held that the exception in Article I, Section 20
did not apply to civil actions exclusively seeking a monetary recovery; therefore,
defendants have a right to a jury trial in this case. 130 Accordingly, the court vacated
the decisions of the Superior Court and remanded it for a new trial. 131
The Law Court may have been influenced by an article by Gerald F. Petruccelli
122. Id. at 670.
123. Id. at 671.
124. The Law Court later acknowledged that “DePaolo overruled Anton without citing it.” Sirois v.
Winslow, 585 A.2d 183, 188 (Me. 1991).
125. DePaolo, 531 A.2d at 670 (citing Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Envtl. Improvement Comm’n., 307
A.2d 1, 28 (Me. 1973); Farnsworth v. Whiting, 106 Me. 430, 76 A. 909 (1910); Kennebec Water Dist. v.
City of Waterville, 96 Me. 234, 246–51, 52 A. 774, 779–81 (1902)).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. The Law Court was criticized for disregarding stare decisis when it ignored Anton in City of
Portland v. DePaolo. Thad B. Zmistowski, Note, City of Portland v. DePaolo: Defining the Role of Stare
Decisis in State Constitutional Decision-Making, 41. ME. L. REV. 201, 203 (1989). The author observed:
In reaching its decision, the Law Court made no mention of the Anton case. Indeed, the
only attempt the court made at confronting Anton consisted in two veiled references, one
to “nice semantic distinctions [and] wooden interpretive principles,” and the other to
“intimations and statements” in prior cases that were “incompatible with the broad view of
the guarantee of a jury trial.”
Id. (alteration in original).
130. DePaolo, 531 A.2d at 671.
131. Id. In addition to the court’s restoration of the broad jury trial right through its proper
interpretation of Article I, Section 20, the court further protected the constitutional right to a jury trial in
DePaolo. Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 80H(g), as amended in 1977, read in conjunction with former
Maine District Court Civil Rule 73, which restricted appeals to questions of law, eliminated the right to a
jury trial for civil violations. Id. The DePaolo court held that to the extent Rule 80H(g) prohibits removal
of a civil violation to the Superior Court, where a jury trial is available, it is unenforceable as a violation
of Article I, Section 20. Id.
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and John D. McKay, “written largely in anticipation of the DePaolo case,”132
published by the Maine Bar Journal in September 1986.133 The authors argued that
the court in Anton went against both the “exceptionally rigorous” jury trial mandates
of the Maine Constitution, as well as the plain text of Section 20. 134 Regarding the
court’s decision in Anton and the extension of the Anton interpretation to Fort
Halifax Packing, the authors stated that:
[T]he Law Court has vigilantly rejected expedient attempts to circumvent the
constitutional guarantee of trial by jury. If State v. Anton and Fort Halifax Packing
hold otherwise they are not consistent with either the text of Section 20 or the
considered opinions of the Law Court from 1821 to 1985.135

The DePaolo interpretation of Article I, Section 20 was further solidified in the
Law Court’s decision in North Sch. Congregate Hous. v. Merrithew in 1989.136 The
question in Merrithew was whether there is a right to a jury trial for a tenant who has
been evicted under Maine’s Forcible Entry and Detainer (FED) statute. 137 The
landlord in this case brought an FED action to the District Court, where jury trials
were unavailable.138 In response, the defendant filed a motion to remove the FED
action to the Superior Court.139 In its analysis, the court stated:
We have recently modified how we analyze the constitutional right to a jury trial to
track more closely the language of [A]rticle I, [S]ection 20. Specifically, our
practice now is to find that there is such a right unless it is affirmatively shown that
a jury trial was unavailable in such a case in 1820.140

The court undertook an in-depth historical analysis to conclude that FED actions
have the right to a jury trial, because suits of a similar nature—actions of eviction—
had such a right prior to 1820, under both common law and Massachusetts statute. 141
The court in Merrithew went beyond its decision in DePaolo to further repair
the right to a civil jury trial under Article I, Section 20 in two important ways. First,
the Merrithew court stated that although the right to a jury trial for FED proceedings
had been eliminated by statute with the creation of the modern district court in 1961,
a jury was used under a Massachusetts statute at the time of the adoption of the Maine
Constitution, as well as under Maine statute from 1824 to 1961.142 According to the
court, the elimination of the right to a jury trial under the Maine District Court Rules
from 1961 onward was in violation of the constitutional right to a jury trial in FED
actions.143 The court declared the rules invalid to the extent they removed the right

132. Sirois v. Winslow, 585 A.2d 183, 189 (Me. 1991).
133. Petruccelli & McKay, supra note 17.
134. Id. at 240, 246.
135. Id. at 246.
136. 558 A.2d 1189 (Me. 1989).
137. Id. at 1189.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1190 (first citing In re Shane T., 544 A.2d 1295, 1297 (Me. 1988); then citing City of
Portland v. DePaolo, 531 A.2d 669, 670 (Me. 1987)).
141. Id. at 1191.
142. Id. at 1191-95.
143. Id. at 1195.
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to a jury trial for civil violations. 144 Second, the court stated that a right to a civil
jury trial exists “unless it is affirmatively shown that a jury trial was unavailable in
such a case in 1820.”145 Thus, the Merrithew court shifted the burden from the party
seeking a jury trial to the party opposing it. Given the complexity of the analysis
required to determine whether such right was available in 1820, the court’s burdenshifting considerably strengthened the jury trial right.
F. The Outer Limits of the Depaolo Interpetation
The court’s strengthening of the right to a civil jury trial under DePaolo soon
led to an important question: how does this stronger right impact new remedies that
did not exist at common law, such as administrative remedies and court procedures?
The limits of the DePaolo interpretation of Article I, Section 20 were tested in Sirois
v. Winslow in 1991.146 In this case, property owners filed a complaint with the
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) for damages sustained as the result
of leaking gasoline tanks on a neighbor’s nearby property. 147 The defendant filed a
motion to dismiss the portion of the complaint regarding alleged damage to property,
on the grounds that plaintiffs had filed a previous claim with the DEP’s
administrative tribunal that “sought recovery for the same damages, and that the
exclusivity provisions of the Acts . . . precluded the Superior Court action.” 148 In
response, the plaintiffs claimed they had a constitutional right to a jury trial to resolve
the issues.149 The Superior Court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the
exclusivity provisions of the Acts in question did not violate plaintiffs’ right to a jury
trial.150 The court reasoned that initially, plaintiffs had the option of choosing
between an administrative hearing with the DEP and proceedings with the court, and
plaintiffs chose the administrative remedy. 151 Under the court’s rationale, the right
to a jury trial was reserved to the plaintiffs only until they elected the administrative
remedy, at which point the administrative remedy became the only remedy
available.152
Plaintiffs filed a motion for a report of the interlocutory ruling, challenging the
Superior Court’s ruling on the issue of the plaintiff’s right to a jury trial in light of
the administrative remedies available under the Acts. 153 The motion was granted by
the Superior Court.154 The Law Court denied the report of a question of law,
concluding that the procedure is “an improper method for deciding the constitutional
question presented,” as “[t]he plaintiffs have yet to establish by either the DEP

144. Id.
145. Id. at 1190 (emphasis added).
146. 585 A.2d 183 (Me. 1991).
147. Id. at 184.
148. Id. Plaintiffs brought action under the Oil Discharge Prevention and Pollution Control Act, 38
M.R.S.A. §§ 541-560 (1978 & Supp. 1989), and the Underground Oil Storage Facilities and Ground Water
Protection Act, 38 M.R.S.A. §§ 561 to 570-G (1978 & Supp. 1989).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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proceeding or the action in the Superior Court that the alleged contamination
occurred or that Winslow was responsible for the contamination.”155
The question at issue, which the court declined to weigh in on via advisory
opinion, tests the strength of the civil jury trial right granted by Article I, Section 20
under the DePaolo interpretation. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Collins
addressed this unanswered question:
The question not answered by DePaolo, and raised here, is whether the language of
[A]rticle I, [S]ection 20 also guarantees the right to a jury trial where the Legislature
has crafted a new remedy that is not a “civil suit.” What makes this question difficult
is the language of the exception; the parties have a right to a jury trial “except in
cases where it has heretofore been otherwise practiced.” Does this clause prevent
the Legislature from ever setting up a non-jury tribunal for any controversy that
would have been settled by a common-law action prior to 1820?156

If the answer to Justice Collins’s question is “yes,” the constitutionality of a
significant body of legislation is called into question, including legislation such as
the Workers’ Compensation Act. In an earlier advisory opinion, 157 the Maine
Supreme Court had concluded that the Workers’ Compensation Act is constitutional
under the Anton interpretation of Article I, Section 20. The court reasoned that
because employees did not have the right to workmen’s compensation under the law
at the time the Constitution was adopted, the exclusion of a civil jury trial under the
Workers’ Compensation Act was not in violation of Article I, Section 20.158
Following DePaolo, the constitutionality of statutes that allow administrative bodies
to preclude a jury from determining controversies would have to be upheld under
another rationale.
In his dissent, Justice Collins stated that applying DePaolo to administrative
proceedings would be too restrictive in limiting the legislature’s ability to authorize
administrative agencies to establish specialized proceedings creating “new remedies
unknown to the common law.”159 His view aligns with the approach suggested by
Petruccelli and McKay, who suggest that jury trial rights under Article I, Section 20
should not be available for “newly established rights . . . or inherently administrative
matters . . . properly assigned to administrative bodies.” 160 Under Justice Collins’s
view, DePaolo should not be applied to cases in which an administrative body is
administering new remedies that were not available under the common law. 161
According to Justice Collins, the court should provide certainty to the legislature that
new remedies created by statute are not in violation of the Maine Constitution in light
of DePaolo, rather than declining to address the question. 162
155. Id. at 185. The court expressed hesitancy in granting a report of a question of law, stating that the
procedure “is a departure from the final judgment rule barring piecemeal appeals and should be used only
on extraordinary occasions.” Id. at 184. The court expressed further reluctance to resolve constitutional
questions via the procedure of report. Id. at 185.
156. Id. at 188-89 (quoting Me. Const. art. I, § 20).
157. Opinion of the Justices, 315 A.2d 847, 854 (Me. 1974).
158. Sirois, 585 A.2d at 189 (citing Opinion of the Justices, 315 A.2d at 854).
159. Id.
160. Id. (quoting Petruccelli & McKay, supra note 17, at 245-46).
161. Id. at 190.
162. Id.
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Although Justice Collins’s dissent is not controlling, it demonstrates the
challenges faced by the judiciary in upholding a broad right to a jury trial under
Article I, Section 20 of the Maine Constitution. The strong right to a civil jury trial
as promised under DePaolo could be a constitutional barrier to new remedies, such
as those designed by administrative agencies. The court has not addressed this issue
to date, and has not amended its opinion on the constitutionality of the Workers’
Compensation Act under the DePaolo interpretation.163
III. THE CURRENT RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL IN CIVIL ACTIONS
The constitutional right to a jury trial must be analyzed independently for each
civil action. To determine whether a jury trial right exists for a particular action, one
must first understand whether that cause of action existed at common law: for Maine,
in or prior to 1820. If the same cause of action existed at the time the Constitution
was adopted, the next step required by the court is to determine whether the cause of
action was granted a jury trial, or if [it] was handled in some other non-jury
proceeding, such as a proceeding under equity jurisdiction. If the cause of action did
not exist at common law, the same analysis must be undertaken by assessing whether
a “suit of a similar nature” was decided in a non-jury proceeding at the time.164 If no
similar cause of action existed, there is an affirmative right to a jury trial under the
DePaolo interpretation of Article I, Section 20.
For several causes of action, the court has determined whether there is a right to
a jury trial using an interpretation consistent with DePaolo.165 For the cases decided
under Anton, the right to a jury trial would likely change under the DePaolo
interpretation of Article I, Section 20, but the court has not yet had the opportunity
to undertake the analysis. Additionally, given the limited number of constitutional
challenges brought by parties seeking a civil jury trial in Maine, the jury trial right
has never been determined for many types of civil actions. This part of the Comment
will analyze the right to a jury trial for several common civil actions and violations
under the court’s most recent interpretation of Article I, Section 20. 166
Civil claims and violations fall into several categories depending on the jury trial
rights they hold. First, we will consider the claims that hold a right to a jury trial
because suits of the same general nature held such a right prior to 1820. These types
of claims have a jury trial right under the DePaolo interpretation of Article I, Section
20, but would also hold a jury trial right under the narrower Anton interpretation.
One example of this type of claim is a small claim proceeding, as discussed earlier
in our analysis of Ela v. Pelletier. Another example is a civil judicial forfeiture. In
1999, the court held in State v. One 1981 Chevrolet Monte Carlo167 that “long before
the adoption of the United States Constitution the common law courts in the Colonies
. . . were exercising jurisdiction in rem in the enforcement of forfeiture statutes.”168

163. Opinion of the Justices, 315 A.2d at 854.
164. See N. Sch. Congregate Hous. v. Merrithew, 558 A.2d 1189, 1192 (Me. 1989).
165. See id.; see also In re Shane T., 544 A.2d 1295, 1296-97 (Me. 1988).
166. See Addendum, infra Part VI, for an outline of the current jury trial right in Maine for several
types of civil actions.
167. 1999 ME 69, ¶ 7, 728 A.2d 1259.
168. Id. (quoting C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 139 (1943)).
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For several actions, the court has undertaken a historical analysis to limit the
jury trial right. These include small claims169 and Forcible Entry and Detainer (FED)
actions.170 The court reasoned that because, prior to 1820, the right to a jury trial
was only available de novo on appeal, both of these actions hold a jury trial right
today only on appeal from a bench trial in the District Court. 171 The one exception
is in FED cases in which title is raised as an issue, which are granted a jury trial
through removal to the Superior Court without first requiring a bench trial. 172
The second category includes claims that do not hold a right to a jury trial
because, at common law, they were heard in equity without a jury in the Court of
Chancery.173 Examples of these actions include proceedings to terminate parental
rights174 as well as actions of civil judicial forfeiture.175 In 1988, the court
determined there to be no jury trial right for termination of parental rights
proceedings in In re Shane T.176 In this case, Shane T.’s father, George, appealed
the probate court’s termination of his parental rights, claiming that the probate court
proceeding violated his right to a jury trial under Article I, Section 20. 177 The court
used the DePaolo interpretation of the provision in its analysis, but stated that this
case was “sharply distinguished from DePaolo,” in which the remedy sought was a
monetary judgment.178 In contrast, the remedy sought in this case was a “coercive,
injunctive-type order against the father governing his future relationship with his
son.”179 The court stated that although the termination of parental rights statute
specifically at issue in this case was a recent statutory creation, similar suits adjusting
the relationship between parent and child were heard in equity without the
intervention of a jury prior to 1820.180 The court’s analysis was similar in Kennebec
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Kueter,181 where the court held in an interlocutory appeal
that there is no jury trial right for a mortgagee bringing a civil foreclosure action. 182
The court determined the action to be equitable in nature, because under
Massachusetts statute prior to the adoption of the Maine Constitution, “matters
related to a mortgage foreclosure were within the equity jurisdiction of the court.” 183
The third category of actions are those in which the court has found in favor of
a jury trial right because the exceptions found in Article I, Section 20 do not apply.
169. See Ela v. Pelletier, 495 A.2d 1225, 1228 (Me. 1985).
170. See Merrithew, 558 A.2d at 1192.
171. See id. at 1196 (stating that “except in title cases, the appropriate procedure is to provide a de
novo jury trial only on appeal after judgment is first entered in the District Court.”); see also Ela, 495
A.2d at 1228 (holding that “According to statutory law of Massachusetts at the time the Maine
Constitution was adopted, a party in a small claim case . . . for an amount not exceeding a statutory limit,
had the right to a jury trial de novo on appeal at the Superior Court. 1783 Mass. Acts ch. 42.”).
172. Merrithew, 558 A.2d at 1196.
173. See In re Shane T., 544 A.2d 1295, 1297 (Me. 1988).
174. Id.
175. State v. One 1981 Chevrolet Monte Carlo, 1999 ME 69, ¶ 7, 728 A.2d 1259.
176. 544 A.2d at 1297.
177. Id. at 1296.
178. Id. at 1297 (citing City of Portland v. DePaolo, 531 A.2d 669, 671 (Me. 1987)).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. 1997 ME 123, 695 A.2d 1201.
182. Id. ¶ 1.
183. Id. ¶ 5 (first citing 1785 Mass. Acts 474-75; then citing 1798 Mass. Acts 127).
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These include: possession of marijuana, 184 possession of drug paraphernalia,185 and
a violation of a city pornography ordinance. 186 Parties to these three actions would
have certainly had no right to a jury trial under Anton. In State v. DiPietro, the State
argued that DiPietro had no jury trial right under Anton, because “no civil suit in
1819 . . . would have been comparable to such a proceeding.” 187 Justice Studstrup
pointed to the court’s shift in its interpretation of Article I, Section 20 in DePaolo,
and concluded, “DePaolo seems to be the controlling law at the present time, and the
State has failed to demonstrate that possession of marijuana (or any other type of
contraband) was not previously entitled to a jury trial.” 188
Because of the unique nature of the Juvenile Code, juvenile proceedings fall
outside the analysis otherwise used to determine the jury trial right in adult
proceedings.189 The court has held there to be no jury trial right in juvenile
proceedings due to the unique rehabilitative purpose of the State’s juvenile justice
system and the Maine Juvenile Code.190 In 1979, the court considered the issue in
State v. Gleason.191 Rather than analyze whether the juvenile had a right to a jury
trial under Article I, Section 7 or Article I, Section 20, the court focused on the due
process requirements of the Federal Constitution to determine whether a jury trial
right existed for the defendant. 192 The court determined that the procedural
safeguards afforded an adult criminal defendant must be afforded a juvenile, unless
these safeguards “compel the States to abandon or displace any of the substantive
benefits of the juvenile process.”193 As the court concluded that it “cannot say that
the juvenile’s interest in obtaining a jury determination outweighs the State’s
continuing interest in the existence of an independent and unique juvenile justice
system,” no jury trial right exists in juvenile proceedings. 194 This result has not been
successfully challenged since Gleason, therefore, the lack of a jury trial right would
likely extend to other juvenile statutory violations as well, including Illegal
Possession by Minors,195 and Illegal Transportation by Minors. 196
The Law Court has not yet had the opportunity to determine the right to a jury
trial for a number of civil actions. For example, the jury trial right for statutory
violations for possessing a “dog at large”197 and keeping a dangerous dog198 have not
been challenged in Maine to date. These are both civil violations with a penalty of
a fine up to $1000, and additional penalties as serious as euthanizing the animal can

184. State v. DePietro, KENSC-CV-2005-VI-04-03 at 1 (Me. Super. Ct., Ken. Cty., Feb. 23, 2005).
185. Id.
186. City of Portland v. DePaolo, 531 A.2d 669, 670 (Me. 1987).
187. State v. DePietro, KENSC-CV-2005-VI-04-03 at 2 (Me. Super. Ct., Ken. Cty., Feb. 23, 2005)
(quoting State v. Anton, 463 A.2d 703, 709 (Me. 1983)).
188. Id. at 3.
189. See State v. Gleason, 404 A.2d 573, 582 (Me. 1979).
190. Id. at 583-85.
191. Id. at 573.
192. Id. at 580.
193. Id. (quoting In re Winship 397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970)).
194. Id. at 585.
195. 28 M.R.S.A. § 2051 (2007 & Supp. 2015).
196. 28-A M.R.S.A. § 2052 (2015).
1.
197.
7 M.R.S.A. § 3911 (2015).
198. Id. § 3952.
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be sanctioned if an individual is found responsible for keeping a dangerous dog. 199
Under the DePaolo interpretation of Article I, Section 20, we must examine “suits
of the same general nature” to determine whether a right to a jury trial exists. 200
Although these violations are statutory, they are similar in nature to nuisance actions
at common law, which were heard in the Court of Common Pleas where jury trials
were available.201 Because these suits of the same general nature were not precluded
from the right to a jury trial at common law, parties to dog at large or keeping a
dangerous dog actions should have an affirmative jury trial right.
IV, DEPAOLO AS THE PROPER LEGAL OUTCOME IN
MAINE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
The Law Court’s reversal of the Anton interpretation of Article I, Section 20 in
its DePaolo decision was the proper legal outcome, and an outcome that is important
to Maine jurisprudence for several reasons. First, the Law Court’s reversal properly
restored the right to a jury trial to one that is consistent with the plain meaning of the
text of Article I, Section 20 of the Maine Constitution. Second, DePaolo, along with
subsequent decisions including North School Congregate Housing, restored judicial
consistency, marking a return to the interpretation of Article I, Section 20 used
without fail by the Law Court from 1821 to 1985.202 The DePaolo decision also
restored an exceptionally strong jury trial mandate that, prior to Anton, had been
rigorously upheld by the Law Court since its decision in Johnson’s Case in 1821.203
Finally, the reversal of Anton reflects the Law Court’s recognition that the Maine
Constitution is separate and distinct from the United States Constitution, which
should provide another layer of constitutional protection for Maine citizens.
Under both the Maine Constitution and the Federal Constitution, the availability
of a jury trial varies based on the type of action in question, and how that action was
adjudicated at common law. In both Maine cases and federal cases, the results of
this analysis can seem counterintuitive. For example, a jury trial is available in a
small claims case, but it is not available in an action to terminate parental rights, an
action whose outcome is likely to have a much greater impact on the parties involved.
Whether the right to a civil jury trial should be based on the gravity of the action in
question, rather than the procedural process that existed at common law, is a question
for the legislature, not the judiciary, and is beyond the scope of this paper. What
must be considered, however, when analyzing the Law Court’s decisions on the right
to a jury trial under the Maine Constitution, is the danger of arbitrary results that
stem from inconsistent constitutional interpretation.
One of the more troubling aspects of the Anton decision was the Law Court’s
disregard for the doctrine of stare decisis. Rather than addressing its departure from
well-established precedent, the Law Court simply wrote as though its interpretation

199. Id.
200. N. Sch. Congregate Hous. v. Merrithew, 558 A.2d 1189, 1190 (Me. 1989).
201. THOMAS J. ARNOLD, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE COURT OF COMMON
PLEAS 25 (1840).
202. Petruccelli & McKay, supra note 17, at 246.
203. See, e.g., id. at 240 (“From the beginning, the Law Court has consistently recognized that the jury
trial mandates of the Maine constitution are exceptionally rigorous.”).
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was a widely accepted one. The primary way the Law Court did so was by
erroneously citing several Maine cases as supporting its interpretation of Article I,
Section 20. These cases do not in any way support the interpretation of the provision
offered by Anton. The first case cited is State v. Sklar,204 which addresses only the
right to a jury trial in a criminal proceeding under Article I, Section 6 of the Maine
Constitution.205 The other cases cited206 establish the principle that types of actions
that would have been heard in a court of equity at common law do not hold a
Constitutional right to a jury trial, but they do not support the Law Court’s
interpretation in Anton that only cases that held a jury trial right at common law
currently hold such a right.
There are significant fairness implications to the Law Court’s disregard for legal
precedent. Although the request for a jury trial is exercised somewhat infrequently
in Maine courts, the Law Court’s inconsistency may have also resulted in the denial
of other jury trial requests in the district court under Anton. Fortunately, the Law
Court mitigated the number of inconsistent outcomes and unfair treatment for those
individuals seeking a jury trial by reversing course through its decision in DePaolo
fairly quickly.
The Law Court’s departure from stare decisis in this line of cases was criticized
in an article written by Thad B. Zmistowski in 1989. 207 Interestingly, Zmistowski
criticized the Law Court for disregarding its precedent established by Anton in its
decision in DePaolo.208 The author did not examine the history of the court’s
interpretation of Article I, Section 20, which establishes that Anton is the outlier from
precedent on the issue of the civil jury trial right, not DePaolo. Nonetheless, by
failing to address its departure from established precedent in any way in either Anton
or DePaolo, the court ignored the time-honored principle of stare decisis and
contributed to a period of inconsistent decisions and confusion in the law.
The Law Court’s correction in DePaolo is in line with the principle of new
judicial federalism, which holds that state constitutions are critically important in
determining the legal rights of state citizens. Maine is one of many states that have
extended greater Constitutional protections to its citizens than are granted under the
Federal Constitution.209 The differences between state constitutions and the Federal
Constitution are frequently overlooked, and federal constitutional law is often
substituted for careful analysis of the unique language of each state’s Constitution,
an approach known as “lockstepping,” 210 that was present in Anton. For provisions
204. 317 A.2d 160 (Me. 1974).
205. Id. at. 161.
206. The Anton court cited the following cases in holding no right to a civil jury trial unless that right
affirmatively existed for such an action at common law: Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Envtl. Improvement
Comm’n, 307 A.2d 1, 28 (Me. 1973), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1035 (1973); Farnsworth v. Whiting,
106 Me. 430, 76 A. 909 (1910) (citing Parker v. Simpson, 62 N.E. 401 (Mass. 1902)); see Opinion of the
Justices, 315 A.2d 847 (Me. 1974) (upholding workers' compensation law); Kennebec Water Dist. v. City
of Waterville, 96 Me. 234, 52 A. 774 (1902) (examining condemnation proceedings); cf. Ashley v. Wait,
116 N.E. 961 (Mass. 1917). 463 A.2d at 708-09.
207. Zmistowski, supra note 69, at 203.
208. Id.
209. See Brennan, supra note 46, at 500.
210. Friedman, supra note 42 (“Under the lockstep approach, the state constitutional analysis begins
and ends with consideration of the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the textual provision at issue.”).
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of the Bill of Rights that have not been incorporated to the states, 211 it is the role of
state courts to interpret the language of the state’s unique constitutional provisions
independently. By substituting interpretations of federal constitutional provisions
for analysis of unique provisions of state constitutions, state courts eliminate a
parallel source of constitutional rights.
In analyzing the Anton decision in light of the three methods of state
constitutional interpretation introduced in Part I, 212 the Law Court’s method of
interpretation aligns most closely with the “lockstepping” approach. The glaring
departure from over one hundred years of precedent in Maine, as well as from the
plain text of the statute, makes the court’s interpretation of Article I, Section 20 an
extreme example of the substitution of federal constitutional law for independent
analysis of the state constitution. By limiting the scope of individual rights under
the Maine constitution to those guaranteed under the Federal Constitution, the Anton
court significantly narrowed the jury trial right that had existed for over one hundred
years in the state of Maine.
The Anton court could have used either the criteria approach or the primacy
approach to its interpretation of Article I, Section 20 to arrive at the proper result.
Under the criteria approach, the court would determine that the plain text of Article
I, Section 20 differed significantly from the text of the Seventh Amendment,
warranting an independent interpretation of the provision. The court could bolster
its analysis by looking at prior case law, which supports the deviation from the
interpretation of the Seventh Amendment. Finally, the Law Court’s unwavering
commitment to a broad jury trial right throughout Maine history supports the
deviation from the federal interpretation of the Seventh Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
The reversal of the Anton interpretation of Article I, Section 20 repaired judicial
consistency, demonstrated sound textual interpretation of the Maine Constitution,
and recognized the Maine Constitution as a unique source of rights for its citizens.
As Justice Brennan so eloquently stated:
[S]tate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full protections
of the [F]ederal Constitution. State constitutions, too, are a font of individual
liberties, their protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme
Court's interpretation of federal law. The legal revolution which has brought federal
law to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of
state law – for without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed.213

Maine has an admirable tradition of upholding a rigorous jury trial right as
guaranteed by her own constitution, despite ongoing pressures to make the judiciary
more efficient, as well as the procedural complications that can arise when honoring
a broad civil jury trial right. Despite a centuries-old tradition of rigorously defending
211. Provisions of the Bill of Rights that have not been incorporated to the states include the Second
Amendment, the Third Amendment, the grand jury indictment clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the
Seventh Amendment. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 765 n.13 (2010).
212. See supra pp. 1-5.
213. Brennan, supra note 46, at 491.
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the broad right to a jury trial in Maine, the Law Court’s decision in Anton shows how
fragile these rights can be if interpreted without rigorous analysis and respect for
historical precedent. Through one poorly crafted and poorly supported decision, the
Law Court reversed its long-standing interpretation of Maine’s provision
guaranteeing a jury trial in civil cases, and eliminated the right to a jury trial for many
plaintiffs in many types of actions. Fortunately, the damage caused by Anton was
mitigated by the Law Court’s fairly quick reversal in DePaolo. Nonetheless, a
historical analysis of Anton illustrates the importance of state constitutions as a
source of individual rights for state citizens, as well as the influence of the judiciary
in determining the scope of those rights.

MAINE LAW REVIEW

194

[Vol. 69:1

VI. ADDENDUM

TABLE 1: THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL FOR CIVIL VIOLATIONS UNDER THE MAINE CONSTITUTION
Civil Action/
Violation

Violation of
Wage
Payment
Statute
26 M.R.S.A.
§ 626

Small claim

Civil judicial
forfeiture

Jury Trial
Right

No

Yes, but
only on
appeal,
following
the
decision
of a
nonjury
court.

Yes

Case Law

“An action to
recover severance
pay under 26
M.R.S.A. § 625-B
. . . creates a new
cause for action
unknown to the
common law.”

“According to
statutory law of
Massachusetts at
the time the Maine
Constitution was
adopted, a party in
a small claim case .
. . for an amount
not exceeding a
statutory limit, had
the right to a jury
trial de novo on
appeal at the
Superior Court.
1783 Mass. Acts
ch. 42.”
“Long before the
adoption of the
United States
Constitution the
common law courts
in the Colonies
. . . were exercising
jurisdiction in rem
in the enforcement
of forfeiture
statutes.”

Source

Dir. of Bureau
of Labor
Standards v.
Fort Halifax
Packing Co.,
510 A.2d
1054, 1063
(Me. 1986).

Ela v.
Pelletier, 495
A.2d 1225,
1228 (Me.
1985).

State v. One
1981
Chevrolet
Monte Carlo,
1999 ME 69, ¶
7, 728 A.2d
1259.

Commentary
Though Fort Halifax
Packing was not
expressly overruled in
DePaolo, the DePaolo
interpretation would
likely determine a right to
a jury trial.
In Merrithew the court
states in a footnote that
the DePaolo
interpretation runs
contrary to its decision in
Fort Halifax Packing.

Right to a jury trial is only
available following the
decision of a nonjury
court in a small claims
case. Id. at 1227. Ela was
decided under Anton, but
would likely lead to the
same result under
DePaolo.
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TABLE 1: THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL FOR CIVIL VIOLATIONS UNDER THE MAINE CONSTITUTION

Termination
of parental
rights

Traffic
Infraction

No

No

“Although the
specific action for
termination of
parental rights is a
creature of recent
statute, P.L. 1979
ch. 733, § 18,
similar suits
adjusting the
relationship
between parent and
child were heard in
equity without the
intervention of a
jury prior to 1820.”
“The legislation
here in question
does not provide
merely that a fine
be levied against a
defendant found
liable for a traffic
infraction. It
reposes discretion
in the District
Court to suspend
the defendant's
operator's license
in addition to or
instead of imposing
a fine. We are
aware of no civil
suit in 1819 that
would have been
comparable to such
a proceeding.”

In Re Shane
T., 544 A.2d
125, 1296-97
(Me. 1988).

State v. Anton,
463 A.2d 703,
709 (Me.
1983).

Though Anton was not
expressly overruled in
Merrithew, the court
modified its interpretation
of the Maine Constitution,
and states in a footnote
that it is contrary to its
interpretation in Anton.
The new interpretation,
which runs contrary to
that used in Anton, is that
there is a civil right to a
jury trial unless there was
a specific exception for a
type of action at common
law.
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TABLE 1: THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL FOR CIVIL VIOLATIONS UNDER THE MAINE CONSTITUTION

Forcible
Entry and
Detainer
(FED)

Mortgagee
bringing a
civil
foreclosure
action

Yes*

No

“Suits under
Maine's modern
FED statute to
evict tenants who
hold over
peaceably are ‘of
the same general
nature’ as the
causes of action
that carried the
right to a jury trial
in 1820. Thus, a
jury trial is
required under
[A]rticle I,
[S]ection 20
because in the
eviction of tenants
prior to 1820 it had
not ‘heretofore
been otherwise
practiced . . . .’”
“Pursuant to the
law of
Massachusetts as it
existed prior to the
adoption of the
Maine
Constitution,
matters related to a
mortgage
foreclosure were
within the equity
jurisdiction of the
court.”

N. Sch.
Congregate
Hous. v.
Merrithew,
558 A.2d
1189, 1192
(Me. 1989).

Kennebec Fed.
Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v.
Kueter, 1997
ME 123, ¶ 5,
695 A.2d
1201.

*Except in cases where
title is raised, judgment in
a bench trial in the
District Court must be
made prior to appeal to
the Superior Court for a
jury trial. Id. at 1197.

The court determined that
the deficiency assessment
procedure is not a
separate action at law, but
is part of a unified civil
foreclosure action, which
was an equity proceeding
at common law. Id. at
1203.
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TABLE 1: THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL FOR CIVIL VIOLATIONS UNDER THE MAINE CONSTITUTION

Violation of
city
ordinance
banning
pornography

Yes,
through
party’s
removal to
Superior
Court

“Nothing in either
the common law or
in the statutory law
of Massachusetts
as they existed
prior to the
adoption of the
Maine Constitution
in 1920 indicates
that defendants in a
case such as the
instant one would
have been denied
the right to a jury
trial.”

City of
Portland v.
DePaolo, 531
A.2d 669, 670
(Me. 1987).

This case solidified the
interpretation that there is
a right to a jury trial in
civil cases unless the type
of action was excluded
from the jury trial right
prior to the ratification of
the Constitution in 1820.

15 M.R.S.A. §
3310 (2014).

Statutory limit on jury
trial for juveniles upheld
in State v. Gleason, in
which the court stated:
“To import a jury trial
requirement into Maine's
juvenile justice system
would not greatly
strengthen the fact-finding
function of the Juvenile
Court, but would result in
definite attrition of that
court's ability to function
in the informal and
protective manner which
has long been a goal of
the system.” 404 A.2d
573, 585 (Me. 1979).

15 M.R.S.A. §
3310 (2014).

Statutory limit on jury
trial for juveniles upheld
in State v. Gleason, 404
A.2d 573, 585 (Me.
1979).

Illegal
transportation
by minors
28-A
M.R.S.A. §
2052

No right
to a jury
trial in
juvenile
proceedin
gs

“The Maine Rules
of Evidence shall
apply in the
adjudicatory
hearing. There
shall be no jury.”

Illegal
possession by
minors 28-A
M.R.S.A. §
2051

No right
to a jury
trial in
juvenile
proceedin
gs

“The Maine Rules
of Evidence shall
apply in the
adjudicatory
hearing. There
shall be no jury.”
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TABLE 1: THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL FOR CIVIL VIOLATIONS UNDER THE MAINE CONSTITUTION

Possession of
Marijuana

Yes

Possession of
Drug
Paraphernalia

Yes

Dog at Large

Dangerous
Dog

In cases of
possession of
marijuana, the
Superior Court
held there to be a
right to a jury trial
in State v. DiPietro
under the DePaolo
interpretation.
In cases of
possession of drug
paraphernalia, the
Superior Court
held there to be a
right to a jury trial
in State v. DiPietro
under the DePaolo
interpretation.

Maybe

Would likely be
considered a
nuisance violation
at Common Law,
which would be
heard in a Court of
Common Pleas.

Maybe

Would likely be
considered a
nuisance violation
at Common Law,
which would be
heard in a Court of
Common Pleas.

2009 ME 12, ¶
5, 964 A.2d
636.

2009 ME 12, ¶
5, 964 A.2d
636.

THOMAS J.
ARNOLD,
REPORTS OF
CASES
ARGUED AND
DETERMINED
IN THE COURT
OF COMMON
PLEAS 25
(1840).
THOMAS J.
ARNOLD,
REPORTS OF
CASES
ARGUED AND
DETERMINED
IN THE COURT
OF COMMON
PLEAS 25
(1840).

